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RETURNING TO ROE: THE RENEWED PROMISE
OF WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH
Cristina Salcedo*
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”1 Yet nearly
a quarter-century after Justice Kennedy first penned those words,
abortion rights still stand on uncertain ground.
Constitutional protections for abortion have been eroded since
first announced in Roe v. Wade. Federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, have narrowly construed the sweeping pronouncements of
Roe.2 And state legislatures, largely in conservative states, have
enacted laws restricting abortion under the guise of protecting
women’s health.3
In 2013, the Texas state legislature passed such a law: House Bill
2 (“H.B. 2”).4 The Bill was ostensibly aimed at “protect[ing] life and
protect[ing] women.”5 However, critics of the Bill argued it would
“dramatically reduce some women’s access to safe, legal abortion.”6
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science,
2013, California State University, Northridge. I would like to thank my parents for their
unconditional love and support during law school. Special thanks are owed to Professor WestFaulcon for her invaluable guidance and feedback throughout the writing process. Cristina Salcedo
is an associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP. The views expressed in the article
are the author’s alone and should not be attributed to Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
or any other attorneys at the firm.
1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
2. See infra, Section III.
3. See Amber Phillips, 14 States Have Passed Laws This Year Making It Harder to Get an
Abortion, WASH. POST (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/
2016/06/01/14-states-have-passed-laws-making-it-harder-to-get-an-abortion-already-this-year.
4. H.B. 2, 83rd Leg., 2nd Called Sess. (Tx. 2013); Amber Phillips, Three States’ Abortion
Laws Just Fell Thanks to the Supreme Court. These Could be Next., WASH. POST (June 28, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/27/how-many-states-could-see-theirabortion-restrictions-struck-down-after-the-supreme-courts-big-ruling.
5. Ariel Walden, Governor Rick Perry Says Senate Bill 5 Will Defend Women’s Health And
Rights of Unborn Children, 790 KYFO (July 1, 2013), http://kfyo.com/governor-rick-perry-sayssenate-bill-5-will-defend-womens-health-and-rights-of-unborn-children-audio/ (statements made
by Texas Governor Rick Perry, who signed the Bill into law) (referring to H.B. 2 as Senate Bill 5).
6. Steffi Badanes, 5 Stories Show How Texas’ HB2 and Other Trap Laws Hurt Abortion
Access, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (June 22, 2016), https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/blog/
5-womens-stories-show-how-texas-hb2-and-other-trap-laws-hurt-abortion-access.
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Several women’s health clinics filed suit against Texas.7 The
clinics challenged two provisions of the Bill: (1) a requirement that
doctors performing abortions have admitting privileges at a nearby
hospital (the “admitting privileges” requirement); and (2) a
requirement that all abortion-providing facilities meet the rigorous
standards of a surgical center (the “surgical center” requirement).8
The case reached the Supreme Court, which struck down both
provisions at issue by a 5-3 vote.9 Abortion activists across the country
declared the decision as a victory. This paper argues that Whole
Woman’s Health hewed closer to the vision articulated in Roe than the
Court’s other post-Roe jurisprudence.
I. PRELUDE TO WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH
A. Factual Background
H.B. 2’s passage was contentious. Before the Bill was voted on,
the floor of the Texas legislature was filled with “often-angry
debate[s]” between proponents and opponents of the legislation in
what was described by some as an “unruly mob.”10 The Bill was also
met with an eleven-hour filibuster conducted by Wendy Davis, a
Democratic state Senator.11 But H.B. 2 still passed by a vote of 96 to
49.12
The controversy surrounding the Bill did not fade away. Several
Texas abortion providers—health clinics and physicians—filed suit in
the Western District of Texas to challenge the constitutionality of two
of the Bill’s provisions: the admitting privileges requirement and the
surgical center requirement.13 The admitting privileges provision
required a “physician performing . . . an abortion” to “have active
admitting privileges at a hospital that [] is located not further than 30
miles from where the abortion [was] performed.”14 The surgical center
provision required that abortion facilities satisfy the “minimum
7. Id.
8. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
9. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016), http://www.
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/whole-womans-health-v-cole.
10. John Schwartz, Texas Resumes Efforts on Abortion Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (July 9,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/us/texas-resumes-efforts-at-abortion-restriction.html.
11. Id.
12. LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/TX/bill/HB2/2013/X2 (last visited Sept. 11, 2016).
13. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
14. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.0031(a) (Supp. 2014).
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standards adopted by [Texas Health & Safety Code] Section 243.010
for ambulatory surgical centers,” including adhering to “detailed
specifications relating to the size of the nursing staff, building
dimensions, and other building requirements.”15
These two provisions had a devastating effect on women’s access
to abortions in Texas. The court initially entered an injunction that was
later lifted.16 In the lead-up to enforcement, several abortion clinics
closed their doors.17 Upon taking effect, the number of abortionproviding facilities in Texas dropped to only eight.18 In essence, the
Bill meant “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased
crowding” for Texas women seeking abortions.19
B. Procedural History
The district court found H.B. 2 unconstitutional.20 It found that
both provisions together and independently violated the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. 21 The court ruled that H.B. 2’s
provisions substantially burdened abortion rights “in a way that is
incompatible with the principles of personal freedom and privacy
protected by the United States Constitution for the 40 years since Roe
v. Wade.”22
Nevertheless, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court on the merits.23 The Fifth Circuit applied a two-part test in which
it first reviewed the law under rational basis scrutiny, then examined
to see if the law unduly burdened abortion rights.24 It found that there
was “no record evidence” to support the district court’s finding that
the Bill imposed an undue burden on abortion.25 The Fifth Circuit held
that both provisions were constitutional because the admitting

15. Id. § 245.010(a); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.40 (2012); Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S.
Ct. at 2314.
16. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
17. Id. at 2301.
18. Id. at 2313 (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680–81 (2014)
(“After September 1, 2014, only seven facilities and a potential eighth will exist in Texas.”)).
19. Id.
20. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 676.
21. Id. at 678.
22. Id. at 686.
23. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 296 (5th Cir. 2014).
24. Id. at 293.
25. Id. at 294–95.
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privileges requirement and the surgical center requirement were
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.26
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Roe v. Wade (1973)
The Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional right to an
abortion four decades ago in Roe v. Wade.27 The Roe Court faced the
issue of whether a Texas statute criminalizing abortion was
constitutional.28 It held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment implies a right to privacy that includes the right to
terminate a pregnancy.29
Roe did not shy away from confronting the consequences of an
unwanted pregnancy in the lives of women.30 It recognized that
forcing a woman to carry a pregnancy to term may cause “the woman
a distressful life and future.”31 Roe even went so far as to state that
“[p]sychological harm may be imminent” in an unwanted pregnancy
and “[m]ental and physical health may be taxed by child care.”32
However, Roe did not hold that women have a limitless right to
an abortion.33 Rather, Roe concluded that women (and their doctors)
had full control of abortion decisions only through the first trimester
of pregnancy.34 Roe declared that states could regulate abortion after
the first trimester to protect women’s health.35 States could also
regulate to protect the potential life of the fetus—including entirely
prohibiting abortion—at the point of fetal viability, which the Court
held to be the start of the third trimester.36

26. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit did not explicitly state what the
“legitimate state interest” was.
27. 410 U.S. 113, 153(1973).
28. Id. at 166; see 1857 TEX. CRIM. STAT. 531–536, invalidated by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); GEO W. PASCHAL, LAWS OF TEXAS 447 (5th ed. 1878); 1879 TEX. CRIM. STAT. 536–
541; 1911 TEXAS REV. CRIM. STAT. 1071–1076.
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54.
31. Id. at 153.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 160, 164–65.
34. Id. at 164.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 163–64.
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B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)
The Court constricted abortion rights in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.37 The Casey Court deviated from
Roe’s categorical prohibition on first-trimester abortion regulations in
crafting the “undue burden” standard.38 It held that laws regulating
abortion were constitutional unless the “purpose or effect” of the law
was “to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion before the fetus attains viability.”39 But the Court did identify
unnecessary health regulations” as imposing an undue, and thus
unconstitutional, burden on abortion rights.40
Casey set forth three major guidelines for applying the “undue
burden” standard.41 First, prior to viability, a woman has the right to
obtain an abortion without “undue interference” from a state.42
Second, states retain the right to restrict abortion rights post-viability,
so long as the law provides exceptions when the life of the mother is
endangered.43 Third, a “[s]tate has legitimate interests from the outset
of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of
the fetus that may become a child.”44 In so holding, Casey rejected
Roe’s trimester model in order “[t]o promote the State’s profound
interest in potential life.”45
C. Gonzales v. Carhart (2007)
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court dealt with the constitutionality
of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.46 The Carhart Court
reiterated Casey’s “undue burden” standard.47 But the Court
nevertheless upheld a ban on intentionally performing partial-birth
abortions in the second trimester that are not necessary to save the life
of the mother.48 The Court focused on the third prong of Casey in
37. 505 U.S. 833 (2007); After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights With Renewed
“Purpose”, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2556 (2006). (“In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Casey,
redefining abortion doctrine.”).
38. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
39. Id. at 837.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 846.
42. Id. at 846.
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 878.
46. 550 U.S. 124, 124–32 (2007).
47. Id. at 146.
48. Id. at 168.
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holding that “[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural
mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound respect for
the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial
obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”49 In the face
of “medical uncertainty” as to whether the Act “subject[ed] women to
significant health risks,” the Court held that “the Act can survive facial
attack when this medical uncertainty persists.”50
Justice Ginsburg’s Carhart dissent rejected the majority’s view
that claimed medical uncertainty justified a blanket ban on an abortion
procedure prior to viability.51 She observed that the opinion “tolerates,
indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure
found necessary and proper in certain cases by the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists” and, “for the first time
since Roe,” “blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a
woman’s health.”52
III. THE WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH DECISION
The 2016 case of Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt marked
the Court’s most recent foray into the realm of abortion rights.53 The
Court was tasked with determining the constitutionality of H.B. 2,
which the Texas legislature passed two years earlier.54 Overruling the
Fifth Circuit, the Court engaged in a skeptical factual analysis and
ultimately struck down the bill.
Before reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Whole Woman’s Health
Court stated it was following the “undue burden” rule set out in
Casey. 55 But unlike the Casey Court, the Whole Woman’s Health
Court held that courts must consider not only “the burdens a law
imposes on abortion access,” but also “the benefits those laws confer”
in ruling on a law’s constitutionality.56

49. Id. at 146.
50. Id. at 129.
51. Id. at 169–71. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 170–71.
53. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
54. See Schwartz, supra note 10; Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
55. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (“[E]ach [provision] constitutes an undue
burden on abortion access, and each violates the Constitution.”).
56. Id. at 2309.
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A. The Court’s Admitting Privileges Analysis
The Court first considered whether the admitting privileges
provision placed an undue burden on abortion rights.57 H.B. 2 required
doctors who performed abortions to possess admitting privileges at a
hospital within thirty miles of where the doctor was performing the
abortion.58 After engaging in a skeptical analysis, the Court struck
down the provision for imposing a substantial burden without a
corresponding benefit.
There was no evidence that admitting privileges actually provided
a benefit to women’s health.59 Texas claimed “the purpose of the
admitting-privileges requirement is to help ensure that women have
easy access to a hospital should complications arise during an abortion
procedure.”60 However, at oral argument, Texas admitted that it could
not name a single instance in which the admitting-privileges
requirement could have “helped even one woman obtain better
treatment.”61
The admitting privilege requirement was also extremely arduous
to satisfy. Hospitals often condition admitting privileges “on reaching
a certain number of admissions [to an emergency room] per year.”62
However, it is very rare that someone getting an abortion needs to be
transferred to an emergency room.63 Of the 17,000 abortions
performed over a decade at one El Paso clinic, no patient required
emergency service.64 It was thus extremely unlikely that any doctor
providing abortions could even obtain the admitting privileges
required under the Bill.
Nor was the requirement logical. Admitting privileges do not
indicate quality, as they typically do not correspond to a doctor’s skill
level. At academic hospitals, for example, admitting privileges may
be given to physicians on the condition that they accept a faculty
appointment.65

57. Id. at 2310–19.
58. Id. at 2310.
59. Id. at 2311–12.
60. Id. at 2311.
61. Id. at 2311–12.
62. Id. at 2312.
63. Id. at 2311.
64. Id. at 2312. (citing Brief of Society Hospital Medicine et al. as Amici Curiae, No. 15-274,
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2016 WL 74953 at * 11).
65. Id. at 2312.
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B. The Court’s Surgical Center Requirement Analysis
The Court next examined the surgical center requirement of H.B.
66
2. H.B. 2 required abortion-providing facilities to satisfy the same
minimum standards as those of ambulatory surgical centers.67 Here
too, the Court struck down the requirement.
The Court agreed with the district court’s finding that the
“surgical-center [requirement did] not benefit patients and [was] not
necessary.”68 It did not help patients who suffer complications after
the procedure because “complications . . . almost always arise only
after the patient has left the facility.”69 The Court also recognized that
abortions performed in Texas were “extremely safe”¾even more so
than procedures that were not subject to the surgical-center
requirement¾and thus “there was no significant health-related
problem that the new law helped to cure.”70
In light of this evidence, the Court held that both provisions at
issue posed an undue burden on abortion rights.71
IV. ANALYSIS
Casey and Carhart departed from Roe’s articulation of abortion
rights in both reasoning and result. An examination of the Court’s
jurisprudence illustrates how Whole Woman’s Health, though
imperfect, was truer to the spirit of Roe.
A. Casey & Carhart: Departures from Roe
After Roe, the Court narrowed its abortion rights jurisprudence.
Later opinions modified, limited, and rejected various aspects of Roe’s
broad view of abortion rights.
Roe embodies the most expansive view of abortion rights yet
embraced by the Court. Roe held that when “fundamental
rights”¾including abortion rights¾are at issue, the Court must
examine the legislation at issue with strict scrutiny.72 Roe ruled that in
66. Id. at 2314.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2315.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2311.
71. Id. at 2299.
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved,
the Court has held regulation limiting these rights may be justified by only a ‘compelling state
interest.’”) (citations omitted).
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the first trimester of pregnancy, a woman’s decision of whether to
elect to have an abortion is within the sole discretion of her and her
doctor.73 Roe also held that states can only regulate abortion to protect
“the potentiality of human life” after the “compelling point” of
viability.74
Casey departed from Roe in a significant manner. The plurality
opinion purported to “reaffirm” Roe’s “essential holding” that women
have a constitutional right to an abortion pre-viability.75 Yet rather
than following Roe’s lead in casting this right as virtually unassailable,
the Casey Court hedged: the right to a first-trimester abortion could
not be subjected to “undue” state interference, such as the imposition
of a “substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the
procedure.”76
Casey also rejected some of the critical tenets of Roe as “rigid.”77
Unlike Roe, Casey held “that the State has legitimate interests from
the outset of the pregnancy . . . in protecting the life of the fetus.”78
Thus, under Casey, states could restrict abortion rights “from the
outset of pregnancy.”79
Casey also did away with the strict scrutiny analysis followed in
Roe. Instead, the plurality in Casey engineered the amorphous “undue
burden” standard.80 While Roe had allowed pre-viability restrictions
on abortion only to promote “the health of the mother,”81 the new
standard set forth no such limitations. Instead, such restrictions were
only impermissible if they imposed “[a] substantial obstacle to the
woman’s effective right to” have an abortion.82 The Court admitted
that this rule was crafted in part to “accommodat[e] the State’s
profound interest in potential life.”83 Most strikingly, under Casey,
legislation would be upheld even “if [its] purpose is [to encourage
women] to choose childbirth over abortion.”84
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 163.
Id.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992).
Id. at 846.
Id. at 837 (“Roe’s rigid trimester framework is rejected.”).
Id. at 834 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
Id. at 837.
Id.
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Given Casey’s limited reading of Roe, it is not surprising that the
Court blessed many of the provisions at issue. Casey found that both
the 24-hour waiting period and parental consent requirements did not
impose an “undue burden” on abortion rights,85 though it overturned
the provision that would require women to notify their husbands
before obtaining an abortion.86
Casey’s analysis largely disregarded the factual background.
Though ostensibly determining whether the provisions at issue posed
an undue burden to abortion access, the Court focused on precedent to
the exclusion of facts. In striking down the parental notification
requirement, the Court relied entirely on precedent.87 And the Court
ignored the underlying facts in upholding both the 24-hour waiting
period and the parental notification provisions.88 The Court’s decision
to do so was curious; it is difficult to gauge whether something
imposes an undue burden on abortion rights without examining the
facts.
The Casey plurality’s application of the undue burden standard
rang hollow. The Court claimed that laws that impose an “undue
burden” on abortion rights must be struck down. Yet the plurality was
not concerned that the waiting period would “result in delays for some
women that might not otherwise exist,”89 nor that the waiting period
would “subject many women to the harassment and hostility of antiabortion protestors.”90 Instead, it stated “[t]he idea that important
decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some
period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable.”91 Overlooking
the lower court’s factual findings, it claimed “they do not demonstrate
that the waiting period constitutes an undue burden.”92
The Court ultimately found the waiting period was constitutional
because it “in no way prohibit[ed] abortion.”93 In essence, the Court
held that legislation does not impose an “undue burden” on abortion if

85. Id. at 840–41.
86. Id. at 896–99.
87. Id. at 899 (“Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a minor
seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian.”).
88. Id. at 881–82, 899.
89. Id. at 969 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
91. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992).
92. Id. at 886
93. Id. at 969 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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it does not prohibit abortion, even if it may significantly prevent
women from obtaining one.
Carhart exacerbated the problem created by Casey. The case
essentially gutted whatever protections Casey retained.94 The Carhart
Court shifted its focus away from the rights of women and effectively
applied the lowest level of scrutiny to abortion rights.
Unlike in Casey, the Court in Carhart did not bother with the
pretense of being concerned with the right of women to control their
own reproductive functions.95 Instead, Carhart centered its analysis
on the State’s interest in potential life and on the purported side effects
of abortion on women. Carhart echoed the Casey Court’s comment
that “the Court’s precedents after Roe had ‘undervalue[d] the State’s
interest in potential life.’”96 Without citing to any evidence, the Court
concluded that a troubling “phenomenon” of women regretting their
abortions existed. 97 According to the Court, abortion can thus cause
“[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.”98
The Carhart Court missed the question it should have asked. Roe
established that abortion is a fundamental right, and any infringement
on a fundamental right must be substantially justified. For all its flaws,
Casey’s “undue burden” standard focused on the right question: To
what extent did the law at issue restrict the exercise of a fundamental
right? Contrarily, Carhart focused on whether the perceived harms
posed by abortion justified the law at issue.
The Court also applied an improper level of scrutiny. In
considering whether the provision should be upheld, the Court noted
that Congress “[had] a rational basis to act.”99 It also thought Congress
had acted in “furtherance of its legitimate interests . . . to promote
respect for life, including life of the unborn.”100 Effectively, the Court
applied rational basis review. When the lowest standard of review is
applied to a fundamental right, it ceases to be a fundamental right.

94. See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 209–10 (2016).
95. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 835 (“The ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.”), with Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“[S]ome women come
to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”).
96. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157–58 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 873).
97. Id. at 159.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 158–59.
100. Id. at 158.
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With respect to partial-birth abortions, Carhart effectively overturned
the rights announced in Roe.
B. The (Partial) Remedy of Whole Woman’s Health
Whole Woman’s Health was a significant improvement on the
Court’s recent jurisprudence and truer to the spirit of Roe. Though the
Court did not return to the strict line-drawing that Roe resorted to, it
treated restrictions on abortion with skepticism and an unwillingness
to defer to the legislature.
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court claimed to follow Casey’s
“undue burden” standard, but in reality pivoted back to Roe’s stringent
skepticism of abortion regulations. First, Whole Woman’s Health held
that “courts [must] consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion
access together with the benefits those laws confer.”101 More
importantly, the Court’s analysis in Whole Woman’s Health was
generally more skeptical of whether the provisions at issue placed an
undue burden on abortion, and thus more reminiscent of Roe’s strict
scrutiny standard. In Casey, only one of the three provisions at issue
was struck down.102 Whole Woman’s Health, though claiming to
follow in Casey’s footsteps, invalidated both of the provisions at
issue.103
Whole Woman’s Health added to Casey’s “undue burden” test by
weighing whether the medical benefits of a regulation justified the
burden on abortion rights.104 Under this standard, a law with no
medical benefits could be struck down even if it imposed only a
minimal burden on abortion rights. This standard permits the Court to
strike down pretextual laws that collectively add up to destroy access
to abortions, even if individually they pose few obstacles.
This new formulation of the “undue burden” test is more in line
with the spirit of Roe. Roe recognized abortion as a fundamental
right.105 Courts generally view restrictions on fundamental rights with
disfavor, and require such restrictions to further compelling state
interests.106 Roe laid out clear guidelines as to what constitutes such a
state interest and when such interests arise. Whole Woman’s Health’s
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–82 (1992).
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.
Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,153 (1973).
See, e.g., id. at 155.
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focus on the benefits posed by abortion-restricting legislation reflects
a similar concern about interfering with a fundamental right.
Whole Woman’s Health also engaged in a careful factual analysis
of the effects of the provision that is more in keeping with the strict
scrutiny standard articulated in Roe. Such a factual analysis—which
the Casey Court refused to engage in—allows the Court to look at the
negative effects that abortion restrictions have on access to abortions,
rather than relying on findings made by a legislature possibly acting
in bad faith. Looking at facts is necessary to determine not only what
the benefits of the law are, but also the level of burden posed by a
particular restriction. Whole Woman’s Health showed that facts
matter. In support of its opinion, the Court cited fifteen factual
conclusions that the trial court had reached.107 Each factual conclusion
illustrated the effect H.B. 2 had on women seeking abortions in
Texas.108
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Concurrence
In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg went farther than the Court
in rebuking the Texas Legislature. Beyond merely determining that
the Bill substantially burdened abortion rights, she also rejected the
notion that H.B. 2 was passed in good faith.109 She penned, “it is
beyond rational belief that H.B. 2 [was enacted to] protect the health
of women.”110
Justice Ginsburg argued that H.B. 2 was nothing more than an
“impediment[] to abortion.”111 Ginsburg pointed out that
“[c]omplication rates from abortion are very low.”112 In contrast to the
majority, she noted that childbirth—the proposed alternative to
abortion—has a higher risk of medical complications than abortion
itself.113 Yet childbirth is not “subject to ambulatory-surgical-center
or hospital admitting-privileges requirements.”114

107. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301–03.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2321 (citing Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 912 (7th
Cir. 2015)).
112. Id. at 2320 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae of The American Civil Liberties Union, The
ACLU of Alabama, The ACLU of Wisconsin, 2015 WL 958314 at *7).
113. Id. at 2320.
114. Id.
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Ginsburg argued that, if anything, regulations such as H.B. 2 put
women’s health in jeopardy. When “a State severely limits access to
safe and legal procedures, women in desperate circumstances may
resort to unlicensed rogue practitioners.”115 She claimed that H.B. 2
was one of a species of regulations targeting abortion providers that
“do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to
abortion.”116 Thus, she stated, “they cannot survive judicial
inspection.”117
Although Whole Woman’s Health was a clear improvement on
Casey and Carhart, Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence is even closer to
the spirit of Roe. Justice Ginsburg did not explicitly argue for a return
to the strict scrutiny standard. Yet she openly questioned the true intent
of the Texas Legislature and thereby essentially subjected the law to a
heightened level of scrutiny.
D. What the Opinion Lacked
Whole Woman’s Health is still far from perfect. Under traditional
constitutional jurisprudence, when fundamental rights such as
abortion rights are at stake, a court must examine the statute with strict
scrutiny.118 Yet Whole Woman’s Health did not return to Roe’s strict
scrutiny standard and instead claimed to apply Casey’s more
deferential standard.119 Many have criticized Casey’s “undue burden”
standard as being not only “more permissive”120 than the strict scrutiny
standard used in Roe, but also “weakly and inconsistently” applied.121
The undue burden standard, even as applied in Whole Woman’s
Health, still permits courts to apply the standard subjectively and thus
inconsistently.

115. Id. at 2321.
116. Id. (citing Schimel, 806 F.3d at 912) (internal quotation omitted).
117. Id.
118. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citing Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
119. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–19.
120. Wharton, et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 330 (2006).
121. Margaret Talbot, The Supreme Court’s Just Application of the Undue-Burden Standard
for Abortion, THE NEW YORKER, (June 27, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/the-supreme-courts-just-application-of-the-undue-burden-standard-for-abortion.
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Nor did the Whole Woman’s Health majority question the Texas
legislature’s motivations for passing H.B. 2.122 Perhaps it should have
followed Justice Ginsburg’s lead. Given the Bill’s negligible medical
benefits, and the devastating impact of the Bill on access to abortions,
it seems clear that the legislation was enacted for the purpose of
reducing abortions. The Court’s failure to critique the Texas
Legislature is more in keeping with Casey than Roe; the Casey Court
held that legislation may not be an undue burden on abortion rights
even “if [its] purpose is [to encourage women] to choose childbirth
over abortion.”123
The opinion also struck an overly sterilized tone. Commentators
have criticized Whole Women’s Health for its almost surgical
approach to an issue that affects women across the country on a very
personal level.124 Yale Law Professor Linda Greenhouse argued that
if an alien had landed on earth and read the opinion, it “would have
had no hint of the decades-long battle over women’s right to abortion
and dogged efforts by states to put obstacles in their way.”125 Put
another way, “[t]here is no poetry in the 40-page opinion.”126
Despite its flaws, the Whole Woman’s Health decision has
undoubtedly protected abortion rights throughout the country. The
decision clears the way for challenges to abortion statutes in roughly
a dozen other states, including ten states with similar “admitting
privileges” requirements.127 After the decision, Alabama’s attorney
general vowed he would no longer defend his state’s own admitting
privileges statute because he could no longer argue in good faith that
it is constitutional.128

122. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Abortion Rights Reemerge Strongly, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 27, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-abortion-rights-reemergestrongly.
123. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992).
124. Linda Greenhouse, The Facts Win out on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/opinion/the-facts-win-out-on-abortion.html.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Phillips, supra note 4; Denniston, supra note 122. The states with similar admitting
privileges statutes are Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.
128. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Whole Woman’s Health is a welcome relief to abortion rights
activists across the country. Not only did the decision invalidate one
of the most restrictive anti-abortion laws in the country, it also
reinvigorated abortion rights after decades of Court retrenchment postRoe. Though claiming to follow the undue burden standard, the Whole
Woman’s Health Court has plotted a new course—one that may lead
back to Roe’s America.

